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Abstract 
This paper presents a political economy model of inflation as a result of social conflict. 
Agents are heterogeneous in terms of income. Agents’ income levels determine their ability 
to hedge against the effects of inflation. The interaction of heterogeneous cash holdings and 
preferences over fiscal policy leads to conflict over how to finance government expenditure.  
 The model makes a number of predictions concerning which environments are 
conducive to the emergence of inflation. Inflation will tend to be higher in countries with 
higher inequality and with greater pro-rich bias in the political system. Conversely, the use of 
income tax will be higher in countries with lower inequality and less pro-rich bias. The model 
also predicts that although inequality and political bias will have an impact on the 
composition of revenue, it will have no effect on the overall level of government spending 
(assuming that spending is on public goods only). These results are largely confirmed by the 
empirical portion of the paper. The paper’s novel features are its simplifications at the 
household level which allow for richer treatment of the income distribution and political 
process than in the related literature. 
 The paper also gives unequivocal comparative statics results under relatively 
undemanding assumptions. 
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1 Introduction
An emerging literature on the macroeconomic consequences of income inequality has iden-
tied a robust positive relationship between inequality and ination (Bhattacharya et al.
(2003); Albanesi (2002); Dolmas et al. (2000); Bulif (1998); Easterly and Fischer (1998);
Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg (1996)).1 This paper offers a political economy explanation for
the relationship. It develops a model whose key features are the existence of elite bias in
the political system and differing distributional consequences of the ination tax and alter-
native tax instruments. The model is similar in spirit to several important recent theoretical
contributions. However, simplications at the household level allow a richer analysis of the
political economy environment and a more general treatment of the income distribution than
has been possible so far. It also gives rise to clear analytical results that facilitate explicit
empirical testing of the theory. The empirical section of the paper lends relatively strong
support to the model.
The model is motivated by a simple public nance problem: the nancing of a public
good via a linear income tax and/or seigniorage. Financial market imperfections mean that
richer agents nd the ination tax easier to avoid, making it a regressive form of taxation.2
The elite bias in the political system gives rise to what is essentially a weighted welfare
maximisation problem, where agents' weight is increasing in income. The choice of income
tax versus seigniorage and the level of government spending is then determined by the inter-
action of three competing motivations. The rst is the standard public nance problem: to
provide the efcient level of the public good via the optimal choice of taxation. The second
motivation is an equity one: to provide a degree of consumption equalisation. This results
from the concavity of agent's utility functions, and biases the policy-maker towards using
income taxation, the more progressive form of taxation, to nance government expenditure.
However, there is a third, political bias effect, that causes the policy-maker to favour poli-
cies more benecial to richer groups in society. This can lead to positive seigniorage in
equilibrium as the burden of taxation is shifted onto the less well-off.
The pro-rich bias is accentuated by increased income inequality, since greater income
dispersion magnies the disparity in political power. The model then predicts that societies
1Bhattacharya et al. (2003) actually identify an inverse-U shaped relationship, positive for all but ex-
tremely high values of inequality. Easterly and Fischer (1998) focus on the income share of the lowest 20% of
the income distribution, rather than an inequality measure based on the entire distribution (such as the Gini co-
efcient). Note as well that some studies assume a causal relationship, and differ in the direction of causation,
whereas others merely note the correlation.
2That seigniorage tends to be a regressive form of taxation, its incidence felt particularly harshly by poorer
agents and the middle classes, is well documented (Easterly and Fischer (2001), Erosa and Ventura (2002),
Kane and Morisett (1993)).
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with more income inequality and where the pro-rich political bias is stronger will tend to
suffer from higher ination.
Although the model is in the tradition of a growing theoretical literature, its precepts
may seem unconventional, particularly in light of earlier formal and informal explanations
of ination. The idea that ination can emerge as a deliberate policy choice, rather than
as a result of policy failure, scal mismanagement, adverse shocks or time inconsistency,
requires some motivation. Similarly, the idea that inationary policies might be related to
`pro-elite' political bias may also appear controversial, not least because in earlier models
that approach the issue, it tends to be `populists'  politicians of the `left'  that are assumed
to be more ination-tolerant. This may arise either from a greater desire to offset output
uctuations, or from the need to nance higher public expenditure.3
The view that left-wing parties may be more averse to output uctuations is certainly
defendable. However, if the resulting inationary bias is greater for the `left-wing' party and
hence more electorally damaging, this party might have the most to gain from a tougher anti-
inationary stance.4 Distributional considerations reinforce this argument. The available
evidence suggests that ination is most harmful for those at the bottom and middle of the
income distribution  the natural constituency of parties of the `left'. Distributional effects
become particularly salient when the issue is placed in a context of scal dominance of
monetary policy, as in this paper. If money creation is scally motivated, its incidence and
distributional dimension relative to alternative tax instruments becomes the critical question.
An expenditure explanation  that ination emerges as a result of increased government
spending and the monetisation of the resultant scal decit  requires that more progressive
tax instruments are unavailable. Otherwise, why would a rational `left-wing' government
adopt a tax instrument that falls heaviest on its favoured constituency?
Because the model makes a number of quite strong assumptions which are central to its
results, it is vulnerable to accusations that these results simply follow directly from the as-
sumptions, with the model contributing few additional insights. However, I believe that the
model delivers insights that are greater than the sum of its assumptions. Firstly, the key re-
lationship is a subtle one: the conditioning effect of political bias on the inequality-ination
relationship. The model illustrates quite precisely the conditions under which the existence
of pro-rich bias gives rise to the positive relationship between ination and inequality. Es-
3For instance, the canonical Partisan Cycle model has two parties (Left (L) and Right (R)) competing for
control over monetary policy, and assumes that the parties differ in the relative weight attached to ination
in their social loss functions. Party L places less weight on ination and more weight on output uctuations,
resulting in a greater ination bias (Persson and Tabellini (2000), pp 426-31).
4And party R (using the Partisan Cycle model's terminology) might gain by increasing the inationary
bias, thus increasing the cost of electing party L and boosting its own reelection chances. See Milesi-Ferretti
(1994).
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sentially, political inuence must increase with income with a greater than unit elasticity, so
that the distribution of political bias is more unequal than that of income and becomes pro-
gressively more unequal, in relation to income, as income inequality increases. Secondly,
the political bias effect is only one effect, balanced by a competing motivation to equalise
income generated by agents' concave utility. The model's contribution is its illustration of
how these effects interact. Finally, both the assumption that political bias increases sharply
with income and the assumption that ination is regressive seem important for any politi-
cal economy model relating to scal and monetary policy. Both relationships have received
robust empirical support, as detailed below. Their implications for policy, analysed in this
paper, also receive empirical backing.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two discusses the relevant theo-
retical and empirical literature. Section three presents the model of the economy. Section
four solves for the rst-best welfare-maximising solution, to provide a suitable benchmark.
Section ve introduces the political economy problem. It solves the Ramsey problem as
a special case, providing a second benchmark. Finally, this section presents the full solu-
tion and undertakes some comparative statics analysis. Section six provides an empirical
analysis of the relationships outlined in the theoretical portion of the paper. The empirical
results are broadly supportive of the paper's theoretical arguments, although there are some
interesting results that merit further research. Section seven concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theoretical Contributions
Traditional models of the cost of ination  such as menu costs/shoe leather cost models and
the new generation of dynamic sticky price models  have tended to place little emphasis
on the distributional impact of price instability. Similarly, most of the `political economy'
literature on monetary policy-making focuses on time-inconsistency issues, or rests on ad-
hoc assumptions over politicians' loss functions, rather than rigorously analysing the usual
questions in the political economy literature relating to distributional conicts.
However, recent years have seen the emergence of a body of literature whose authors
have developed important theoretical insights into how distributional and political economy
factors can inuence ination performance. Albanesi (2002) and Sturzenegger (1992) both
adopt variants of the cash-credit goods model. Sturzenegger (1992) introduces a foreign cur-
rency explicitly, whilst Albanesi (2002) uses the standard Lucas and Stokey (1983) model, in
which a subset of goods must be bought with cash, subject to a cash-in-advance constraint,
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and the remainder can be purchased with a costly credit technology. Albanesi argues for  at
least in part  a reverse pattern of causation running from inequality to ination to motivate
the relationship between the variables uncovered in her empirical work. Using a bargaining
model to proxy for the political determination of policy, she shows that greater inequal-
ity heightens the political conict over scal policy, leading to the adoption of inationary
nancing.
Dolmas et al. (2000) use an overlapping generations framework, with a single tax
(seigniorage) used to nance lump sum transfers. Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg (1996) take
a similar position, arguing that ination is essentially a progressive form of taxation since it
reduces the value of public debt which is largely held by wealthier agents. In both papers
higher inequality makes the median voter relatively less well-off, increasing the govern-
ment's incentives to rely on inationary nance. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) employ an
overlapping generations model similar to that in this paper, and predict an inverse-U shaped
relationship between inequality and seigniorage. Unlike the earlier two papers, they allow
for substitution out of cash by richer agents, making seigniorage a regressive tax. Ination
initially increases in inequality but falls for very high levels of inequality due to a tax-base
effect (basically a Laffer-curve argument). The possible weaknesses of this approach are
twofold. Firstly, the treatment of the political economy dimension, based on discretising the
policy choice and assuming a series of bilateral contests, is somewhat counterintuitive and
does not match the approach taken elsewhere in the political economy literature. Secondly,
the paper relies on simulation, making it difcult for the authors to pin down the processes
driving their results.
Desai et al. (2003) argue that inequality and the political system interact to drive ina-
tion performance. In high inequality countries, more democracy leads to higher ination
as a result of populist attempts at redistribution. By contrast, in low inequality countries,
the main problem is parasitic governing elites that create ination to transfer resources to
themselves. In this environment more political competition will reduce ination.
2.2 Empirical Contributions
2.2.1 Distributional effects of ination
Kane and Morisett (1993) identify at least four channels by which ination can affect the
distribution of income. Agents tend to face differential access to anti-ination hedging tools
 such as foreign-currency denominated or interest-bearing assets. Ination also shifts the
wage prole as differential bargaining strength or access to indexed wages results in differ-
ential rates of real wage erosion. A third channel is heterogeneity with respect to liabilities
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 some groups have access to subsidised loans whose nominal interest rates may fail to fully
reect inationary pressures. Finally, scal drag  the Tanzi-Olivera effect  reduces the real
value of non- or inadequately indexed taxes and transfers, redistributing from net tax-payers
to net benet-recipients.
Kane and Morisett analyse Brazilian data and nd that high ination redistributed in-
come from the poor  who suffered real wage erosion  and the middle class  who suffered
the erosion of cash balances  to the rich, worsening the country's already highly skewed
distribution of income. Ferreira and Litcheld (1999) also analyse Brazilian data, and nd
some time-series evidence of ination leading to higher inequality. Cardoso (1992) supports
Kane and Morisett's view that ination's impact on the poor is primarily through its effect
on real wages  a result of imperfect indexation  whereas it is the middle class that pays
the ination tax on cash balances.
Some papers have combined empirical analysis with a more rigorous theoretical ap-
proach, using a cash-credit goods framework  with an increasing returns element to the
credit technology  to argue that the ination tax is regressive. This corresponds to the
`hedging' channel outlined by Kane and Morisett. Erosa and Ventura (2002) analyse US
data, showing that poorer agents are more reliant on cash holdings as a proportion of their
aggregate wealth, making them more exposed to the ination tax.5 Calibrating a mone-
tary growth model based on a cash-credit goods framework, they show that the welfare and
redistributive effects of allowing for this agent heterogeneity are signicant.
A parallel research question asks which groups in society are more ination averse.
Higher ination-aversion amongst poorer groups would suggest that ination is regressive
in character. Fischer and Huizinga (1982) use US survey data from the 1970s to analyse
how factors such as income and political afliation affect relative preferences over ination
and unemployment. They nd that for the US, simple analysis of sample means suggests the
rich are more likely to rate ination as more important than unemployment, but regression
analysis does not uncover a statistically signicant income effect. Scheve (2002) analyses
UK survey data from 1995, and nds that although holders of nominal assets are more
ination averse (as one would expect), there is not a signicant income effect on ination-
aversion. However, Easterly and Fischer (1998) analyse international survey data which
asks respondents to rate which of a range of possible domestic problems they feel to be of
greatest concern. They nd that the probability of nominating ination as of high concern is
higher for poorer and less educated respondents.
Shiller (1996) presents survey data from the US, Germany and Brazil in an attempt
5Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin [32] report similar ndings from the 1989 US Survey of Consumer Finances.
Wealthier and older agents are more likely to hold interest-bearing assets.
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to answer a related question: Why do people dislike ination? He nds that the traditional
economist's answer  with a focus on menu costs and the like  is not generally held amongst
the population as a whole. Non-economists tend to view ination as `unfair' because it arbi-
trarily redistributes income. This indicates that for the public at large  if not for economists
 the redistributive impact of ination is central.
2.2.2 Ination and Inequality: cross-sectional studies
Romer and Romer (1998) use a cross-sectional framework to analyse the effect of macro-
economic policies on the distribution of income. They nd that macroeconomic stability
and low ination are associated with improved well-being of the poor over the long-run.
Bulif (1998) also uses a cross-sectional approach, regressing gini coefcients on a number
of explanatory variables, including a quadratic expression in income (to test the Kuznets
hypothesis) and dummies for hyperination, high ination, low moderate ination and very
low ination. He nds that higher ination is associated with more inequality, although
the result seems to exhibit a degree of non-monotonicity. In particular, hyperinationary
countries have higher inequality than other countries but at lower levels of ination the rela-
tionship is not so clear-cut. Earlier work by the same author (Bulif and Gulde, 1995) based
on a panel of developing and industrial countries also uncovered a positive relationship be-
tween ination and inequality. Easterly and Fischer (1998) use cross-country data and nd
that higher ination is associated with the lower 20% of the income distribution having a
smaller share of total income, lower minimum wage rates in relative terms, and higher rates
of poverty. An IMF (1996) survey of global inationary trends found that `high average
ination and high variability of ination increase income inequality signicantly.'
Other authors analyse the link between ination and poverty. Datt and Ravallion (2002)
analyse panel data from Indian states and nd that regional differences in the ination rate
contribute positively to poverty. Conversely, Epaulard (2003) studies a cross-section of
almost 100 growth and downturn episodes in developing countries and nds that very high
ination increases the responsiveness of poverty to economic slowdowns, but ination has
no direct effect on poverty.
Albanesi (2002) also adopts a cash-credit goods model, and presents evidence of a cross-
country correlation between ination and inequality in support of the positive relationship
predicted by her theoretical work. Dolmas et al. (2000) and Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg
(1996) present empirical evidence of a positive relationship between ination and inequality,
which they take to support their model linking ination to populism. Dolmas et al. (2000)
controls for measures of central bank independence. However, in neither case does the data
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allow an explicit test of the political channel hypothesised.6 In fact the evidence presented
in section six below, covering a wider range of countries, suggests that ination is high-
est in autocracies, which contradicts the papers' hypothesis linking ination to populism.
Furthermore, the balance of evidence in the literature, as discussed above, suggests that in-
ation is regressive (certainly compared to alternative means of nance). This undermines
the validity of modelling the ination tax as a progressive form of taxation. It also makes
these papers' results vulnerable to the addition of alternative tax instruments, such as a lin-
ear income tax. Bhattacharya et al.'s (2003) prediction of an inverse-U shaped relationship
between inequality and seigniorage is supported by the empirical evidence presented in their
paper.
Cukierman et al. (1992) focus on political conict and instability  which one would
expect to be linked with inequality other things being equal  rather than on inequality
per se. They argue that political instability leads policy-makers to hold off from scal re-
forms for electoral reasons, leading to a greater reliance on inationary nancing. They nd
some cross-sectional evidence to support this hypothesis. However, Click (1998) nds that
seigniorage is explained by the differential costs of different methods of taxation and by the
institutional set-up governing the central bank, but the measures of political instability in
Cukierman et al. are not signicant once these other factors are controlled for. Desai et al.
(2003) present some empirical support for their model based on inequality conditioning the
relationship between ination and democracy.
3 The Model
3.1 Demographics, Technology and the Household Problem
The model employs a simplied overlapping generations framework, similar in spirit to that
in Bhattacharya et al. (2003) but greatly simplied to allow for analytical solutions and to
facilitate a fuller treatment of the income distribution and the political environment.
Each household lives for two periods, with one cohort born each period. In the rst
period the household receives an endowment of the consumption good, yi. Consumption
takes place in the second period, but the good is assumed to be perishable and is destroyed
after one period. Hence some transactions technology is necessary to allow the `young'
to transfer their endowment to the `old' in exchange for purchasing power the following
6One could also criticise the econometric analysis of the latter paper for its relatively small sample size
(23 democracies), its reliance on the exclusion of an awkward outlier (Israel) for its results, and the limited
number of controls employed.
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period. There are two assets in the economy to facilitate this exchange: cash (whose supply
is controlled by the government) and a second asset in xed supply.7 This second asset can
be thought of as a real asset, a foreign currency or an indexed asset. Essentially it is an
ination shelter.
Agents are heterogeneous in their labour endowment. The endowment is given by:
yi   1; 2 (1)
yi  0 (2)
with cdf F (y) ; f
 
yi = 0

= f
 
yi !1 = 0
@
@2
eyZ
0
yf (y) dy  0 8ey (3)
Inequality (3) states that increases in the variance of the income distribution from, say,
20 to 21  20 delivers a distribution F1 (y) that second order stochastically dominates the
initial distribution F0 (y).
Households face a utility cost of operating in the market for the second asset, denoted
i.8 This cost is assumed to fall with yi:
i =  (y)  0 (4)
> 0 for y nite (5)
@
@y
 0 (6)
The empirical and theoretical work on portfolio choice has posited the existence of xed
costs of participation in markets for non-cash nancial assets. Luttmer (1999) analyses
US data on asset holdings and argues that the lower bound on the cost is 3% of monthly
per capita consumption. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996) argue that the xed cost varies
across agents due to individual-specic characteristics, including age, education and nan-
cial wealth. These characteristics in turn affect income. The simple inverse relationship
between the cost of nancial diversication and income employed here can be thought of as
a reduced form of a more complex model of portfolio choice.
7The value of each asset depends on the availability of goods supplied by agents in the following period
who wish to exchange for the asset, so that - for instance - the value of the asset falls if fewer goods are
available for purchase (the price of the goods in terms of the asset increases).
8Households will not substitute their endowment for a mixture of both assets, because the cost of accessing
the market for the second asset is a xed cost that does not vary in the value of the xed asset held. Hence, a
corner solution is always chosen.
8
Utility is given by:
U i = ln ci +  ln g   iDi (7)
Di =
(
1 if agent exchanges endowment for the second asset;
0 if exchange is for cash
(8)
In addition to consuming the private good, agents also consume a public good g which is
funded out of taxation and seigniorage revenue. The log utility formulation is necessary for
expositional simplicity. Explicit taxation is in the form of a linear income tax  which is
paid out of consumption goods immediately prior to consumption.
The nominal value of assets received in exchange for the endowment is given by:
ait = d
i
t +m
i
t =

Diqt +
 
1 Di pt yi (9)
where p and q are the prices of goods in terms of cash and the second asset respectively (al-
ternatively, the inverse of the assets' prices, taking the consumption good as the numeraire),
and m and d are nominal holdings of cash and the second asset by the household following
production.
Consumption is at period t + 1 prices. Hence, the household budget constraint is given
by:
ci +  ty
i =
dit
qt+1
+
mit
pt+1
=

Di
qt
qt+1
+
 
1 Di pt
pt+1

yi (10)
The time subscripts on the prices reect the fact that agents receive their endowment one
period before consuming themselves. The sole consumption decision for the household is
which asset to hold, which comes down to a choice of Di 2 [0; 1]:
Di 2 [0; 1] = argmaxU i = ln ci +  ln gt   iDi (11)
s:t:
ci +  ty
i =
mit
pt+1
+
dit
qt+1
=

Di
qt
qt+1
+
 
1 Di pt
pt+1

yi (12)
Which yields the solution:
Di = 0 if i > ln

qt
qt+1
   t

  ln

pt
pt+1
   t

= ln
"
qt
qt+1
   t
pt
pt+1
   t
#
; 1 otherwise (13)
Note that in the foregoing discussion and in what follows, all time subscripts refer to the
period in which the cohort producing or consuming was born, except prices, which refer to
the current period.
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3.2 General Equilibrium
General Equilibrium is dened by the optimal asset-holding decision for each household,
based on beliefs about the evolution of prices p and q, market clearing conditions for cash,
the second asset, and goods, and budget constraints for each household and the government:
ci +  ty
i =
mit
pt+1
+
dit
qt+1
=

Di
qt
qt+1
+
 
1 Di pt
pt+1

yi;8i (14)
Dit = 0 if 
i > ln
"
qt
qt+1
   t
pt
pt+1
   t
#
; 1 otherwise;8i (15)
qt
Z
i
yiDitf
 
yi

di = dt  d (16)
pt
Z
i
yi
 
1 Dit

f
 
yi

di = mt (17)Z
i
citf
 
yi

di+ gt =
Z
i
yif
 
yi

di  1 (18)
gt =  t +
mt+1  mt
pt+1
(19)
The rst equation (14) above gives the household budget constraint. Equation (15) gives
the optimal choice for each household in terms of exchanging its endowment for cash or the
second asset. Equations (16) and (17) equate supply and demand for the second asset and
cash respectively (market clearing conditions for the asset market). In these equations the
terms dt (= d) andmt without superscripts represent aggregate quantities.
Equation (18) gives market clearing conditions in the goods market. Note that the equa-
tions denote general equilibrium for period t+1, when the cohort born in period t consumes
public and private goods and is taxed. Hence, total consumption by cohort t is equal to the
total endowment of the period t+ 1 cohort (1 by assumption). The nal equation (19) gives
the government balanced budget constraint. It shows that the public good must be funded
out of tax revenue and seigniorage.
4 Planner Problem
The planner problem provides us with a benchmark against which to judge the political
economy outcome derived in the following section. The planner is constrained by the econ-
omy's resource constraint but not by the constraints imposed by individual behaviour, since
all allocations can be imposed centrally by assumption. The planner problem can therefore
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be expressed as:
max
cit;D
i
t;gt
Wt =
Z
i

ln cit +  ln gt   iDit

f
 
yi

di (20)
s:t:Z
i
citf
 
yi

di+ gt = 1 [0t] (21)
The sole constraint is the economy-wide resource constraint: that total cohort t public
and private consumption is equal to total cohort t + 1 endowment, which is equal to unity
by construction.
First order conditions are given by:
1
cit
= 0t

cit

(22)

gt
= 0t [gt] (23)
Hence, all agents consume the same level of private consumption:
cit = c; 8i; t (24)
Since consumption is equalised via transfers, the authorities can circumvent the equity-
efciency trade-off. Substituting into the economy-wide resource constraint gives the opti-
mal (efcient) level of the public good:
gt = g = 1  c (25)
Hence:
c =
1
1 + 
(26)
g =

1 + 
(27)
Differentiating with respect to Dit yields:
@Wt
@Dit
=  i < 0 (28)
which implies that Dit = 0;8i; t.
Note that the choice of seigniorage versus income tax is orthogonal to the planner
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problem because all redistributive effects on private consumption can be offset by individual
taxes and transfers.
5 Political Economy Equilibrium
The political economy environment of the economy is introduced in this section. I also
analyse the Ramsey problem here  a benign policy-maker choosing optimal welfare-maximising
policies in a decentralised setting  since it is easily incorporated as a special case of the po-
litical economy game. The rst subsection outlines the political economy environment. The
second analyses the Ramsey solution, whilst the third analyses the general solution.
Before describing the political economy problem in detail, I introduce some further no-
tation. Dividing by the relevant price level, real balances and the real stock of the second
asset can be expressed as:
bmt  mt
pt
=
Z
i
yi
 
1 Dit

f
 
yi

di (29)
bdt  dt
qt
=
Z
i
yiDitf
 
yi

di = 1  bmt (30)
Note that, from the second-order stochastic dominance assumption on the income distri-
bution,
@ (1  bm)
@2
 0 (31)
I also introduce the following notation for price level ination, measured in terms of the
`ination tax':
pt
pt+1
 pt
pt (t + 1)
= 1  t
t + 1
 1  bt (32)
qt
qt+1
 1  bqt (33)
Finally, I dene a variable t that summarises the policy stance in terms of  t and price
changes:
t =
1  bqt    t
1  bt    t (34)
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Substituting this into the decision rule for Dit yields the following:
Dit = 0 if 
i > ln t; 1 otherwise (35)
i:e: if y < by   1 (ln t) ; 1 otherwise (36)
@by
@t
 0 (37)
5.1 Political Economy Environment
I adopt the probabilistic voting model originally due to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). I
adopt the formulation of Persson and Tabellini (2000). The usefulness of the probabilistic
voting model over alternative models (such as the simple Downes-Hotelling median voter
theory) is its additional tractability, as the introduction of uncertainty in the voting function
removes the non-continuities associated with the earlier median-voter models. This greater
tractability is particularly important when agent heterogeneity makes the political economy
environment more complex.
It also introduces a greater degree of realism to the model, as in reality votes over party
platforms are determined not only by the particular issue or issues under analysis, but by a
variety of other issues. One way of dealing with this is to label extraneous factors as `ide-
ology' and model preferences over this factor as essentially random, as in the probabilistic
voting model. Finally, the model has the additional advantage that it can easily be applied
to multidimensional contests, such as the one analysed here. By contrast, the median voter
model can only be generalised to multidimensional problems if they can be rendered es-
sentially unidimensional by making simplifying assumptions about how policies map into
voters' preferences.
5.1.1 The Probablistic Voting Model
Policy-makers are elected for one period, and choose a level of government expenditure gt,
a single income tax rate  t, and an expansion in the money supply (mt+1  mt). The latter
is equivalent to choosing a rate of ination t or more conveniently a rate of the ination tax
(seigniorage) bt. Policy-makers derive utility only from being elected, and therefore adopt
a policy vector Gt  fgt;  t; btg to maximise their probability of being elected.9 There are
two policy-makers seeking election, and the electoral rule is simple majority voting. For
simplicity, it is assumed that policy positions are announced and the election occurs after
9Although the set of policy instruments includes three separate instruments, the government balanced-
budget constaint implies that only two can be independent.
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agents have made their asset-holding choices. That is, only the `old' vote, with the vote
taking place at the start of their second period of life.
In addition to their utility derived from consuming public and private goods, agents
have some intrinsic bias towards one or other of the candidates, which is uncorrelated with
other aspects of their individual characteristics, notably their income. The bias has two
components, an individual-specic bias and an economy-wide bias, both of which vary over
time. If the two candidates are denoted fA;Bg, then the biases are denoted as a bias in
favour of candidate B, so that a negative value implies a bias towards candidate A. The
individual-specic bias is denoted "i, whilst the economy-wide bias is denoted . "i is
uniformly distributed as:
"i  U

  1
2
;
1
2

(38)
I make a critical assumption that agents differ in their political `weight' wi, where the
weight is increasing monotonically in income. This reduced-form formulation is designed
to account for the observed greater political participation by richer agents (see Benabou,
2000 and 2003 for similar models and comprehensive evidence of the inuence of income
on political activity and inuence)10. It can be rationalised by introducing lobbying (see
Persson and Tabellini, 2000) or by simply making richer agents more likely to vote, or by
making the variance of the noise in agents' voting rules vary inversely with income.
Formally, I assume that agents' weight maps into income monotonically, with the rela-
10Benabou (2003) quotes a startling study of political responsiveness of US senators, which nds that
senators' responsiveness to the views of their constituents (as deduced from survey data) is between 3 and 15
times higher for voters in the 75th percentile than for those in the 25th percentile. The responsiveness to views
of voters in the 99th percentile is 2-3 times higher still. And this is in a mature representative democracy. As he
points out, in poorer countries `there is also extensive vote-buying, clientism, intimidation and the like, which
are likely to result in even more bias.'
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tionship indexed by a `pro-rich bias' term   0 such that:
wi = w
 
yi; 
  wmin; wmin
ymin
> 0 (39)
@w (yi)
@yi
 0 (40)
E
 
wi

= 1 (41)
wi = yi for  = 0 (42)
@ (1  A)
@
 0 (43)
1
(1  bm) @ (1  bm)@2  1(1  A) @ (1  A)@2 (44)
where bm = byZ
0
yf (y) dy and A 
byZ
0
w (y) f (y) dy (45)
Hence the political weight is monotonically increasing with income (yielding greater
political inuence to agents higher up the income scale). Since wi = yi for  = 0 and
@A
@
 0, the distribution of weights second-order stochastically dominates income.11
Finally, note that the elasticity of the income of non-cash-holders (or their real holdings
of the non-cash asset) with respect to the inequality parameter is assumed to be lower than
the elasticity of their weighted mass with respect to the same parameter (Equation (44)).
This condition essentially says that the degree to which the distribution of weights second-
order stochastically dominates the distribution of income is increasing in inequality. This
assumption is critical to the result that increasing inequality leads to greater seigniorage. It
ensures that greater income inequality generates a decrease in the effective ination-averse
electorate that outweighs the reduction in the tax base of the ination tax.12
The economy-wide random bias towards candidate B distributed as:
11The assumption that the distribution of weights second-order stochastic dominates the distribution of
income is necessary to generate interesting results. This is because the log-linear specication for utility
implies that @U@C , the marginal utility of consumption, equals
1
C . When the weights are distributed with less
inequality than income, the lobbying effect is insufcient to outweigh the utility-equalisation effect implied by
the diminishing marginal utility associated with log utility. If utility had a linear specication, then any positive
relation between income and political weight would be sufcient to overcome the utility-equalisation effect,
because marginal utilities would already be equal across agents (equal to unity) by assumption. For relatively
low levels of bias (i.e. if  < 0 were assumed), A  bm; that is, the distribution of weights is second-order
stochastically dominated by the distribution of income. In this case there is no incentive to create ination (in
this simple model) and no marginal effect from increasing 2 or .
12This assumption essentially requires that the weighting function w
 
yi; 

should be sufciently elastic
with respect to income.
15
  U

  1
2 
;
1
2 

(46)
Voter i prefers candidate A if:
U i
 
GAt

> U i
 
GBt

+ "it +  (47)
Therefore, an agent of type i is a swing voter (indifferent between the two candidates) if:
"it = U
i
 
GAt
  U i  GBt    (48)
Candidate A's probability of winning is therefore given as:
pAt =
1
2
+
Z
i
wif
 
yi
 
U i
 
GAt
  U i  GBt  di (49)
5.1.2 Timing
The timing of key events is as follows: cohort t is born in period t and trades its endowment
with agents of cohort t   1 (and possibly the monetary authorities) for either cash or the
second asset, at period t prices. In period t + 1, with agents' asset holdings predetermined,
agents (from cohort t only) vote for one of two candidates proposing a policy platform
G. Agents of cohort t and the monetary authorities then trade with cohort t + 1 in the
asset markets, obtaining consumption goods in exchange for their assets at period t + 1
prices.13 Government then implements its policy platform, collecting income tax revenues
in the form of consumption goods from agents in cohort t and producing the public good
from the consumption goods obtained in income tax and in exchange for seigniorage (i.e.
collected from agents in cohort t via the ination tax). Finally, agents in cohort t consume
public and private goods and then die, the winning political candidate leaves ofce, and
period t+ 1 comes to an end with cohort t+ 1 still holding assets to trade with cohort t+ 2
for the latter cohort's endowments.
5.1.3 Solving the Model
Each candidate maximises his probability of winning the election, which is equivalent to
maximising a weighted social welfare function subject to the government budget constraint.
13Because each agent consumes in one period only, there is no intertemporal consumption choice and hence
no rate of time preference and no interest rate (this is why the Friedman rule is not optimal).
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The solution is given formally for candidate A but as discussed above candidate B faces a
symmetrical problem and arrives at the same policy solution.
Formally, candidate A's problem is given by:
max
GAt
pAt =
1
2
+
Z
i
wif
 
yi
 
U i
 
GAt
  U i  GBt  di (50)
s:t:
GAt  fgt;  t; btg (51)
U i  ln cit +  ln gt   iDit;8i (52)
gt =  t + bmt+1   bmt (1  bt) [0t] (53)
cit =

(1  bqt    t)Di + (1  bt    t)  1 Di yi;8i (54)
Dit = 0 if y < by   1 (ln t) ; 1 otherwise;8i (55)
The solution to this policy problem is derived from three rst order conditions, one each
for bt,  t and gt. The three conditions are given below.
1
1   t   bt
byZ
0
wif
 
yi
  0t bmt = 0 [b] (56)
1
1   t   bt
byZ
0
wif
 
yi

+
1
1   t   bqt
1Z
by
wif
 
yi
  0t = 0 [ ] (57)

gt
  0t = 0 [g] (58)
The rst two rst order conditions can be combined as:
1bmt
byZ
0
wif
 
yi

=
byZ
0
wif
 
yi

+
1
t
1Z
by
wif
 
yi

(59)
This assumes that both nancing instruments are used in equilibrium and that the marginal
costs are therefore equal at the margin. Hence we arrive at the following implicit solution
for t:
t =
1  A
A
bm
1  bm  1 (60)
Assuming that this solution is unique, then the solution for t has to be time invariant.
Hence, agents' production sector decisions are also time invariant, which implies that qt is
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constant and bqt = 0;8t. This implies that:
 =
1  
1     b  1 (61)
5.2 Ramsey Solution
The Ramsey problem is to maximise aggregate welfare through the optimal choice of instru-
ments available to the policy-maker and subject to all the behavioural constraints imposed by
equilibrium behaviour on the part of the private sector. The Ramsey solution can be thought
of as the solution to the probabilistic model without the pro-rich bias that enters into the
policy-maker's objective function. This is because, absent this bias, the policy-maker sim-
ply maximises aggregate welfare. In other words, the Ramsey solution equals the general
solution with wi = 1 8i.
The key characteristic of the Ramsey solution is that there is no seigniorage in equilib-
rium. To see this, note that if wi = 1 8i then:
 =
1  F (by)
F (by) bm1  bm  1 (62)
With   1, F (by) = bm = 1 (all agents hold cash). Hence  = 1 and b = 0. The
rationale for this is simple. Absent political-economy considerations, the policy-maker
faces a standard trade-off between efciency (optimal public good provision) and equity
(consumption-equalisation). Since seigniorage is the more regressive of the two tax instru-
ments, it worsens the trade-off and is therefore not utilised in equilibrium.14
Note as well that the level of the public good g is equal to the rst-best level. This
is demonstrated in the following section for the general political economy solution (but
obviously holds for the special case Ramsey solution as well).
5.3 General Political Economy Solution
The concavity of the utility function makes the policy-maker disinclined to use seigniorage,
since it worsens inequality. However, the political economy environment makes the policy-
maker more inclined to use seigniorage, since it transfers resources to his more favoured
constituency, richer agents. Hence, the optimal mix of tax and seigniorage is that which bal-
ances these two effects. When seigniorage is low relative to total government expenditure,
14This result also supports the standard Ramsey tax argument: to tax inelastic factors. Since agents can
substitute out of cash-holding (at a cost), cash-holding is tax-elastic. By contrast the tax base for the income
tax is xed.
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the authorities can increase its use, transferring more resources to richer agents. However,
as seigniorage increases and the consumption of better-off agents rises and that of poorer
agents falls, the marginal utilities of the less well-off become weighted more heavily in the
policy-maker's objective function. Hence, the political bias effect becomes less important
relative to the redistribution effect. Eventually, the two effects counter-balance each other,
giving the optimal mix of tax and seigniorage.
Hence, when   0:
 =
1  A
A
bm
1  bm  1 (63)
5.3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Political Economy Equilibrium
A solution for  always exists for  > 0. To see this, re-arrange the rst order conditions
(56-57) to give an expression for the marginal costs and benets of seigniorage:
h  MC  MB = A (1  bm)  (1  A) bm (64)
h
F (by) (1  F (by)) = wy   yw (65)
where w  E [w j y  by] , w  E [w j y > by]
and y; y are similarly dened.
When  ! 1, then y ! 1, w ! 1 (almost all agents are cash-holders) and w > y. Hence:
h
F (by) (1  F (by)) !   (w   y) < 0 (66)
Therefore, for  close to 1,MC  MB  0.
Now consider  ! 1. In this case, y ! 1, w ! 1 (almost all agents are non-cash-
holders). Hence:
h
F (by) (1  F (by)) ! w   y > 0 (67)
Therefore, for very high ,MC  MB  0. Since the expressions are continuous, at least
one solution withMC =MB must exist for  2 [1;1].
Moreover, since MC  MB for  ! 1 and MC  MB for  ! 1, then at least
one of the solutions also satises the second-order condition for the political economy
maximisation problem (@[MC MB]
@
> 0). Simulations using various functional forms for
F (y) ; w (y; ; 2) and  (y) suggest that the FOCs do generally describe a unique solution.
Figure 1 gives a graphical exposition of equilibrium that sheds more light on this issue. It
plots the MC and MB functions, A (1  bm) and (1  A) bm respectively, against the cdf
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F (by ()).15
Although a unique solution to the FOC is not guaranteed for general functional forms, a
restriction can be introduced to guarantee a unique solution. Re-arranging the two functions
gives us (MC =MB): (   1) = 1
1 bm   bmA   1. A sufcient condition to guarantee a
single crossing point is therefore that, for any value of  =  satisfying the FOC:16
@
@by [ln (   1) j  = ] =    10 (by)  @@by ln
 bm
A
  1

(68)
In other words, the function  should have a sufciently steep (negative) gradient and the
ratio bm
A
should not be too greatly affected by incremental changes in by (requiring that both
the underlying distribution F (y) and the mapping w (y; ) should be relatively smooth). For
the rest of the paper I assume that this condition holds and that the FOCs therefore describe
a unique solution for .17
5.3.2 Comparative Statics
The key comparative statics result is that d
d2
> 0. That is, as income inequality increases,
the optimal mix of seigniorage versus income tax shifts towards the former. To show this
formally, note that (using the implicit function theorem):
 =  j [h ()  A (1  bm)  (1  A) bm = 0] (69)
=) d

d2
=  
@h(;2)
@2
@h(;2)
@
(70)
15The specic functional forms used to generate the diagram are as follows: y = 0:7 + 0:3"; " 

 
1; e2   1;w = 3y 2;  = 3y ; where denotes a log-normal distribution. See Aitchison and Brown (1957)
for details of the calculations using the log-normal distribution. These functional forms meet the model's key
assumptions.
16The other term in the (log-transformed) MB function,   ln (1  bm) has @(  ln(1 bm))@by = 11 bm @ bm@by  0.
17This condition guarantees a unique local maximum. Even when there is more than one local maximum,
the uniqueness of the global maximum is (virtually) guaranteed. However, in this case the comparative sta-
tics results, derived for the local maximum, could not automatically be interpreted as describing the global
maximum as well.
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From the second order condition for the maximisation problem, @h(
;2)
@
> 0. Hence,
d
d2
 0 if @h(
;2)
@2
 0. This condition does indeed hold in equilibrium:
@h (;2)
@2
=
h (;2) + bm
A
@A
@2
  h (
;2) + 1  A
1  bm @ bm@2 (71)
=
bm
A
@A
@2
  1  A
1  bm @ bm@2 (72)
=
  bm(1 A)
A
h
1
(1 A)
@(1 A)
@2
  1
(1 bm) @(1 bm)@2
i
  (1 A)(bm A)
A(1 bm) @(1 bm)@2
 0 (73)
Hence:
Result 1(a): Ination increases with income inequality
Result 2(a): Income tax decreases with income inequality
The rationale for these results is that higher inequality increases the relative weight of
richer agents in the quasi-welfare maximisation problem resulting from the probabilistic
voting set-up. This then tilts the policy-maker towards greater ination nance and away
from income tax as a source of revenue.
Similarly, increasing the political bias (by increasing ) also increases relative use of the
ination tax:
@h (; )
@
=
h (; ) + bm
A
@A
@
(74)
=
bm
A
@A
@
 0 (75)
=) d

d
=  
@h(;)
@
@h(;)
@
 0 (76)
Hence:
Result 1(b): Ination increases with the pro-rich bias
Result 2(b): Income tax decreases with the pro-rich bias
5.3.3 Effect on Government Spending
Changing inequality and pro-rich bias have no effect on government spending in this model.
This is a result of the log-linear additively separable utility specication and the fact that all
spending is in the form of a public good. Essentially, distributional considerations matter for
the composition of taxation and its incidence but not for aggregate revenue or expenditure.
To see this formally, rewrite the three FOCs (the FOC for  has been simplied using the
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rst FOC):
1
1     b Abm = 0 [b] (77)
1
1  
1  A
1  bm = 0 [ ] (78)

g
= 0 [g] (79)
Substituting the government budget constraint (53) and the third FOC (79) into the rst
two FOCs (77-78) yields:
A = 0 [1  (1  bm) b] bm  bm (80)
1  A = 0 [1 + bmb] (1  bm)   (1  bm) (81)
Combining (80-81) then gives us:
1 = 0    (82)
which implies that 0 = 1 + , a constant, and hence that g = 1+ , the rst-best level of
government spending. Hence:
Result 3: Government nal expenditure is unrelated to both (a) inequality; and (b) pro-
rich bias.
Note that this result is due to the assumption of additive separability in the utility function
with respect to private good and public good consumption. This is a simplifying assumption
of the model and is not central to the analysis; in this sense result 3 is not central to the paper.
However, if the inequality and bias terms are found to affect tax and seigniorage choices then
the test of result 3 is essentially a check that the model's emphasis on the revenue side rather
than the expenditure side is correct.
6 Empirical Analysis
This empirical section tests the central results derived in the theoretical portion of the paper:
1. Higher seigniorage results from:
(a) greater income inequality; and
(b) greater pro-rich bias in policy-making;
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2. Higher income tax revenue results from:
(a) less income inequality; and
(b) less pro-rich bias in policy-making;
3. Government nal expenditure (excluding transfers) is unrelated to both:
(a) income inequality; and
(b) pro-rich bias.
The results are strongly supportive of propositions 1(a) and 1(b). Result 3 (a) is strongly
supported, and there is reasonably strong support for Result 3 (b). There is some evidence
supporting Results 2(a) and 2(b), although the evidence is not robust to specication or
sample. The rst section describes the methodology employed and the data used. The
second section discusses the results of the empirical analysis, and the third section offers a
brief discussion.
6.1 Methodology and Data
This paper analyses ination as the result of a political conict over nancing public expen-
diture. The key linkages are between the government budget constraint and seigniorage, and
between money creation and ination. Both linkages should be conceived as long term phe-
nomena. In the short run, the gap between expenditure and tax revenue can be made up by
borrowing; recourse to seigniorage is not necessary until the costs of borrowing outweigh
the benets, which may not occur until a substantial degree of borrowing has occurred.
Similarly, although Friedman's assertion concerning ination's monetary genesis is not to
be doubted, the short run relationship between the money supply and ination is notoriously
difcult to pin down (except during hyperinationary periods).
Hence, I have taken the long run as the appropriate time frame for analysis. This pre-
cludes the use of a panel approach to the problem, and I therefore adopt a simple cross-
section framework. Data availability makes the 1981-2000 period the most fruitful for
analysis.
I obtain data from a range of sources. Inequality data is obtained from the UNU/WIDER
World Income Inequality Database (WIID) in the form of Gini coefcients.18 The quality of
the observations and the survey method is coded in the data: I use only the highest quality
18The starting point for the database (contributing to around half the total observations) is the more widely-
used Deininger and Squire (World Bank, 1997) dataset (used, for instance, in Bhattacharya et al. (2003)).
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data where the sample used is representative of the country's full population, and adjust
observations to take into account the survey method (gross versus net and income versus
expenditure).19 The data is presented in annual format, although with a substantial number of
missing observations for most countries. In order to maximise the number of observations,
data are averaged over the period (i.e. data may be unavailable for the rst year of the period,
but available for subsequent years). To control for the endogeneity of income inequality I
use a measure of inequality from the previous twenty-year period (similarly calculated) as
an instrument and undertake Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).
There are several widely-used datasets of political institutions available to the researcher,
which focus on both specic areas of difference (presidential vs parliamentary, `left' vs
`right') as well as general indicators (`democracy' vs `autocracy'). I attempt to exploit the
wide range of information by using as my measure of `pro rich bias,' b, a variable derived
from as wide a range of sources as possible. Hence, I use factor analysis (principal factor
method) to generate a single indicator from ve separate variables taken from four datasets.
Each component represents a measure of political participation or competition.20 This is
based on the assumption that when political participation is limited, the poor are the rst
to be shut out from the political process.21 The model suggests that the political bias term
plays a role when it is high ( > 0). If the political bias is below this threshold (so that
agents' political inuence is increasing in income, but less than proportionately, so that the
distribution of income second order stochastically dominates the distribution of political
inuence), then there is no effect. Hence, I allow for different slopes for high and low values
for the derived measure.22 I also allow for differential effects of inequality depending on
whether the bias term is high or low, for the same reason.
I nd that two other variables from the various datasets can be signicant as controls.
These are a `Left-wing executive' indicator from the World Bank Database of Political In-
19The appropriate adjustment is calculated by regressing the high quality observations on dummy variables
for Expenditure vs. Income and Gross vs. Net measures, interacted with a dummy for Industrial vs. Develop-
ing/Transition economies to proxy for the substantial structural differences between tax and transfer systems
between the two groups of countries. This gives an estimate of the average difference between Gini coefcients
based on the different measurement techniques, which is unbiased as long as the choice of methodology for
the inequality survey is exogenous.
20The ve variables are `Index of Electoral Competitiveness (executive elections)' from the World Bank's
Database of Political Institutions (DPI); `Political Participation' and `Freedom of Association' from the
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database; `Competitiveness of Political Participation' from the
Polity IV (P4) database, and the `Political Freedom' indicator from Freedom House. Each component variable
is averaged over the period before being combined using factor analysis. Correlation between the ve variables
for the 53-country sample varies from 66% to 92%.
21The most obvious example is property or income restrictions on the franchise, although other, less ex-
plicit, mechanisms are also likely to be present.
22The derived measure b is divided according to b ? 0. This bifurcation occurs around the 72nd percentile
in the 53-country sample.
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stitutions and a measure of regime instability derived from a measure of `Durability' taken
from the Polity IV dataset.23
The dependent variables are the average of the "ination tax" transform (b) over the
period (the average of the annual rates, taken from the IMF's International Financial Sta-
tistics) and the average ratios of income tax revenue and government nal consumption
spending to GDP (both taken from the World Bank'sWorld Development Indicators). I also
include a number of other control variables, including dummies for industrial countries, for-
mer Eastern Block countries and South American countries, measures of trade openness and
real (PPP) GDP per capita taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT 6.1), and a measure of
urbanisation (% of the population living in urban areas, taken from the World Bank World
Development Indicators). These controls are taken for the rst year of the period to denote
initial conditions.
Because the sample size is relatively small, I have attempted to conserve degrees of
freedom by limiting the controls in the preferred specications. In these regressions, controls
have been chosen optimally according to two rules:
1. All controls should be individually statistically signicant at the 10% level or above;
2. Within the class of specications meeting requirement 1, the preferred specication is
that which minimises the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE).
Once the set of controls has been arrived at, I test for the equality of slope and intercept
coefcients for the b high and b low groups. When the hypothesis that coefcients are equal
cannot be rejected (at the 10% level) I present results with equality imposed, to increase the
model's degrees of freedom and improve the efciency of the parameter estimates. I also
present regression results with the full range of controls for robustness purposes (again, I
test for equality of coefcients and impose it when the evidence is supportive).
6.2 Results
The Results are presented in Tables 1-3 in the Appendix. In each Table, the rst three
columns show results from the preferred specication. The last three regressions include the
23The latter variable is a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if the existing political system has
substantially changed in the last 10 years. This variable is derived from the `Durable' variable in the Polity IV
dataset which measures the number of years since the last signicant change in the political system, dened
as an absolute change of more than 3 points in the `Polity' variable which codes countries on a -10 to +10
(autocratic to democratic) scale. The instability dummy then takes a value of 1 if `Durable'<10, implying that
the existing system is less than 10 years old, and 0 otherwise. This variable is taken from the rst year of the
period; the other variable is a period average.
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full range of control variables. Within each group of three regressions, the rst is for the
largest available sample; the second has only Developing and Transition economies, whilst
the third regression drops only former Communist countries in Eastern Europe.
The results in Table 1 are strongly supportive of Result 1(a). The coefcient on the
gini coefcient is positive, as predicted, and statistically signicant in all six specications.
There is some evidence that the slope may be lower for observations with high values for
the bias term, which contradicts the hypothesis; however, the difference between the slopes
is only statistically signicant for the developing/transition economies subsample.24 The
results are also supportive of Result 1(b): in each specication the coefcient on b for high
values of b has the predicted positive sign, and is also statistically signicant. The caveat to
this result is that in one specication the intercept is higher for countries with low values ofb, implying a non-monotonic relationship.25
Table 2 presents the results with respect to Results 2(a)-(b). Here the results are not
particularly strong. The predicted negative relationship between the Gini coefcient and
income tax revenues is conrmed by only two specications, and in neither case is the
result robust to including the full range of controls. The negative relationship between the
bias term and income tax is similarly conrmed by only two specications (in one case
the relationship is non-linear), and again is not robust to the choice of controls in either
case. Only in one specication and sample (column one) are both coefcients signicantly
negative. The evidence generally points to there being no difference in the relationships
between high-bias and low-bias observations.
Finally, Table 3 presents tests of Results 3(a)-(b). For Result 3(a) all specications
conrm that inequality has no effect on expenditure, as predicted. However, with respect
to Result 3(b), the political bias term does affect expenditure in the preferred specication,
with a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship. The signicance of the relationship is not
robust when the full range of controls is introduced or a different sample is used (although
the positive effect from high values of bias is maintained in one other regression).
24For the developing/transition economy sub-sample, increasing inequality appears to be associated with
higher ination for low-bias countries, but has no statistically signicant effect for high-bias countries. This
result could be seen as supportive of the hypothesis advanced by Desai et al (2002), that inequality interacts
with the degree of democracy, so that inationary pressures are more pronounced in low inequality countries
with autocratic regimes and high inequality countries with democratic regimes.
25On the other hand, the intercept is lower for these countries when a different sample is used (column
2), although this is difcult to interpret as the slopes for the gini coefcient are also allowed to differ in this
specication, so that some of the difference in intercept may be due to this.
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6.3 Discussion
The results uncovered in Tables 1-3 are quantitatively as well as qualitatively signicant.
According to the preferred specication and sample (rst column of results, corresponding
to parsimonious controls and the full sample), the inequality measure has a quantitatively
signicant positive effect on ination. The range of the inequality parameter (gini coef-
cient) in the 53-country sample is 22% to 54%. Given the coefcient estimate of .0089,
the estimated effect of increasing inequality from the lowest inequality observation to the
highest would be to add an additional 0.29 to the ination tax transform. If ination were
initially at zero, this would translate into an increase in the ination rate to around 41%.
Similarly, increasing the political bias term b from 0 to its maximum value (1.43) shifts the
ination rate from zero to 21%. Reducing the political bias term from 0 to its minimum
value (-1.20) also raises the ination rate, to 13%, due to the intercept term. However, this
intercept term is not statistically signicant in most specications.
Using the same specication and sample (minus one country due to data availability
constraints), shifting from the lowest to the highest gini coefcient reduces income tax rev-
enues (as a % of GDP) by six percentage points. The negative relationship between the bias
term and income tax revenues appears to be monotonic. Moving from the lowest value forb (-1.20) to the highest value (1.43) reduces income tax revenues (as a % of GDP) by ve
percentage points. These effects are statistically signicant in the preferred specication and
sample; however, the signicance level is not maintained across different specications and
samples.
Finally, inequality appears to have no effect on government consumption (as a % of
GDP), as predicted by the theory. However, there does appear to be a U-shaped relationship
between b and government consumption. In the preferred specication and sample, moving
from b = 0 to either of its extreme values is estimated to increase the government consump-
tion/ GDP ratio by around six-seven percentage points. This effect is unique to this sample
and specication (although in one other regression the positive effect for higher values of
the bias term is maintained). Other results suggest no relationship, in line with the model's
predictions.
The apparent non-monotonicity in the relationship between political bias and the ina-
tion tax transform (uncovered in column 1 of Table 1) requires further analysis. It appears
that ination is higher for low levels of bias, then drops at b = 0 before increasing in b for
higher levels of bias. One explanation could be that at low levels of bias the core conict
is not between cash-holders and non cash-holders, but between poorer recipients of govern-
ment programmes (who are insulated, to an extent, from all forms of taxation) and middle
class tax-payers who are more concerned with the level of taxation than the choice of tax
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instrument. Hence, increasing the level of bias might primarily increase middle-class rep-
resentation, reducing the level of government spending and the share of income taken in
both income tax and seigniorage. This could explain the downwards-sloping relationship
between government consumption expenditure and the bias term for low levels of bias un-
covered in Table 3, columns 1 and 3, and why income tax revenues fall as the bias term
increases for low levels of bias in particular (Table 2, columns 1 and 3). A more complex
model of the political process and public nance environment, incorporating targeted scal
transfers or local public goods, could capture these relationships.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents a model to account for a stylised fact noted in a number of studies: that
more unequal societies tend to face higher ination. The model uses a simplied overlapping
generations framework to capture the essential features of a cash economy with politically-
motivated monetary expansions. Consumption is subject to a one-period delay. Agents have
a choice of two nancial assets to allow for trade with their neighbouring cohorts: cash
(subject to the ination tax) and a second asset which can be thought of as an indexed asset,
a real asset or a foreign currency asset. The ability to substitute from cash to the second
asset is assumed to be correlated with income.
This then generates the feature that seigniorage is a more regressive form of taxation
than income tax, matching arguments made elsewhere in the literature. Introducing an
electorally-motivated policy-maker and a political environment subject to a pro-elite bias,
the model predicts that higher inequality and greater bias both lead to greater recourse to
seigniorage compared to income tax in equilibrium. The result with respect to the politi-
cal bias is obvious, the result with respect to inequality perhaps less so. Note that positive
seigniorage is the result of the political process alone: pure welfare-maximisation implies
zero seigniorage (as shown by the solution to the Ramsey problem).
The model's strengths lie in its simplications at the household level. These allow for
analytical solutions and greater realism in both the income distribution and the political en-
vironment, compared to the related literature, notably Albanesi (2002) and Bhattacharya et
al. (2003). Although the model is micro-founded and agents are fully rational, the treat-
ment of the household could be strengthened. But the purpose of this paper is to analyse
economy-wide political phenomena, and a realistic treatment of political processes and the
income distribution is more important than attention to micro-foundations. Analytical so-
lutions and unequivocal comparative statics results are other signicant advantages of this
approach.
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The model's predictions are brought to the data and are broadly supported for the lim-
ited (53 country) cross-section dictated by data availability constraints. Overall, the model's
predictions with respect to ination (R1(a) and R1(b)) receive robust support. The hypoth-
esised negative effect of both inequality and political bias on income tax revenues (R2(a)
and R3(b)) is supported in the preferred specication, but the results are not robust to the
addition of other controls or across all samples. The prediction of no relationship between
inequality or political bias and government consumption (R3(a) and R3(b)) is supported,
although there is some limited and non-robust evidence suggesting a U-shaped relationship
between the bias term and government consumption.
Possible extensions to the model include the analysis of dynamics (although the analysis
of dynamic political economy models is highly complex  see for instance Krusell and Rios-
Rull (1999), Krusell (2002) and Hassler et al. (2003)), and further empirical work to analyse
the predicted relationships. A panel data approach to the problem would be a desirable next
step. However, data availability constraints  particularly due to the long-run nature of the
relationships under analysis and the limited availability of good inequality series  make
useful panel analysis difcult.
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Table 1: 2SLS Regressions with Inflation Tax Transform [π/(1+ π)] (1981-2000 average) as DV 
 
Preferred Specification Full Controls  
Full 
Sample 
Dev/Trans 
Economies 
Excluding 
E. Europe 
Full Sample Dev/Trans 
Economies† 
Excluding E. 
Europe 
Gini (G) .00891*** 
(.00251) 
 .00921*** 
(.00254) 
.00862*** 
(.00252) 
 .00885*** 
(.00254) 
G×d  .00182 
(.00300) 
  .00336 
(.00337) 
 
G×(1-d)  .0124*** 
(.00376) 
  .0115** 
(.00459) 
 
Bias (B)       
B×d .120*** 
(.0345) 
.0700** 
(.0325) 
.119*** 
(.0349) 
.129*** 
(.0408) 
.109** 
(.0424) 
.129*** 
(.0406) 
B×(1-d) -.0562 
(.0714) 
-.00772 
(.0670) 
-.0560 
(.0716) 
-.0627 
(.0739) 
-.0580 
(.0813) 
-.0632 
(.0748) 
d = I(B>0) -.108* 
(.0640) 
.342** 
(.150) 
-.109 
(.0648) 
-.101 
(.0677) 
.217 
(.202) 
-.102 
(.0680) 
Left    .0485 
(.0354) 
.0704 
(.0598) 
.0486 
(.0354) 
Unstable    .0399 
(.0330) 
.0253 
(.0478) 
.0410 
(.0332) 
Indust -.108** 
(.0483) 
 -.106** 
(.0485) 
-.137** 
(.0653) 
 -.141** 
(.00660) 
E. Eur .268*** 
(.0703) 
  .246*** 
(.0756) 
.0897 
(.0923) 
 
S. America .106** 
(.0500) 
 .105** 
(.0499) 
.0794 
(.0494) 
.0610 
(.0585) 
.0822 
(.0494) 
Openness -.000637 
(.000408) 
-.00198*** 
(.000578) 
-.000589 
(.000403) 
-.000665 
(.000426) 
-.00141** 
(.000623) 
-.000598 
(.000428) 
Urbanisation  .00218*** 
(.000763) 
 .000999 
(.000916) 
.000555 
(.00192) 
-.000848 
(.000942) 
Real PC 
GDP 
   .000000330 
(.00000547) 
.0000105 
(.0000134) 
.00000120 
(.00000563) 
Constant -.144 
(.0893) 
-.291** 
(.132) 
-.157* 
(.0911) 
-.217** 
(.0975) 
-.299* 
(.153) 
-.227** 
(.0991) 
R2 .60 .53 .58 .65 .62 .63 
F-Statistic 8.49*** 3.20** 8.02*** 6.85*** 3.14*** 6.77*** 
Observations 53 35 51 53 35 51 
F0 (G) 2.11 5.36** 1.71 1.82 2.02 1.39 
F1 (B) 4.35** 3.52* 4.41** 3.00* 2.75 3.17* 
F2 (G, B, d) 5.53*** 3.29** 5.32*** 4.43*** 4.85*** 4.20** 
B = 0: %ile 72 58 74 72 58 74 
 
Gini (1981-2000) instrumented by Gini (1961-80). 
SEs reported are robust. 
Controls in ‘Preferred Specification’ regressions selected using following criteria: 
(1) Create set of regression equations where all included controls are individually significant at the 10% level; 
(2) Select from among these equations the equation that minimises the root mean square error (RMSE). 
‘Full Controls’ regression results also shown as a robustness check. 
Significance level of individual regressors and of the overall equation denoted by ***:1%; **:5%; *:10%. 
                                                 
† Test of joint significance F2 rejects equality of coefficients, but individual significance tests for Gini and 
Bias do not reject equality of coefficients. Hence, unrestricted results reported. 
Table 2: 2SLS Regressions with Income Tax Revenues [% GDP] (1981-2000 average) as DV 
 
Preferred Specification Full Controls  
Full 
Sample 
Dev/Trans 
Economies 
Excluding 
E. Europe 
Full Sample Dev/Trans 
Economies 
Excluding E. 
Europe 
Gini (G) -.00181* 
(.000955) 
-.00212** 
(.000838) 
-.00126 -.00118 
(.00131) 
-.00183 
(.00126) 
-.00116 
(.00129) 
G×d       
G×(1-d)       
Bias (B) -.0174** 
(.00669) 
-.00491 
(.00962) 
 -.0105 
(.0101) 
-.00319 
(.0113) 
-.0108 
(.0100) 
B×d   -.0000273 
(.0197) 
   
B×(1-d)   -.0400*** 
(.0138) 
   
d = I(B>0)   .00301 
(.0160) 
   
Left -.0240* 
(.0138) 
 -.0307* 
(.0154) 
-.0300 
(.0134) 
-.0207 
(.0162) 
-.0299* 
(.0162) 
Unstable -.0279** 
(.0103) 
 -.0214** 
(.00937) 
-.0280** 
(.0119) 
-.0253* 
(.0130) 
-.0279** 
(.0119) 
Indust    .0186 
(.0283) 
 .0184 
(.0282) 
E. Eur    .0143 
(.0211) 
-.0187 
(.0282) 
 
S. America    -.0168 
(.0243) 
.00239 
(.0244) 
-.0166 
(.0243) 
Openness    -.000155 
(.000163) 
-.000227 
(.000207) 
-.000150 
(.000167) 
Urbanisation .000694** 
(.000264) 
 .000607** 
(.000249) 
.000865* 
(.000456) 
-.000460 
(.000674) 
.000853* 
(.000465) 
Real PC 
GDP 
 .00000754*** 
(.00000264) 
 -.000000783 
(.00000235) 
.0000114** 
(.00000549) 
-.000000717 
(.00000240) 
Constant .103*** 
(.0366) 
.0893** 
(.0323) 
.0714* 
(.0366) 
.0866* 
(.0488) 
.117** 
(.0482) 
.0858* 
(.0483) 
R2 .55 .38 .59 .61 .52 .60 
F-Statistic 12.55*** 5.13*** 9.46*** 16.53*** 4.07*** 10.2*** 
Observations 52 34 50 52 34 50 
F0 (G) .004 .267 .571 .164 .0718 .187 
F1 (B) 1.14 1.08 3.02* .643 1.44 .665 
F2 (G, B, d) .745 .584 1.51 .255 1.08 .267 
B = 0: %ile 73 60 75 73 60 75 
 
All regressions contain the sample for Tables 1 and 3 excluding Tanzania. 
Gini (1981-2000) instrumented by Gini (1961-80). 
SEs reported are robust. 
Controls in ‘Preferred Specification’ regressions selected using following criteria: 
(1) Create set of regression equations where all included controls are individually significant at the 10% level; 
(2) Select from among these equations the equation that minimises the root mean square error (RMSE). 
‘Full Controls’ regression results also shown as a robustness check. 
Significance level of individual regressors and of the overall equation denoted by ***:1%; **:5%; *:10%. 
Table 3: 2SLS Regressions with Government Final Consumption [% GDP] (1981-2000 average) as DV 
 
Preferred Specification Full Controls  
Full 
Sample 
Dev/Trans 
Economies 
Excluding E. 
Europe 
Full Sample Dev/Trans 
Economies 
Excluding E. 
Europe 
Gini (G) .0000467 
(.000920) 
.000244 
(.000929) 
.000220 
(.00108) 
.000242 
(.00124) 
-.0000313 
(.00158) 
.000312 
(.00122) 
G×d       
G×(1-d)       
Bias (B)  -.00195 
(.0159) 
 .00131 
(.0124) 
.00543 
(.0119) 
.00115 
(.0123) 
B×d .0408* 
(.0207) 
 .0416* 
(.0241) 
   
B×(1-d) -.0511** 
(.0197) 
 -.0217 
(.0211) 
   
d = I(B>0) -.00994 
(.0190) 
 -.0222 
(.0182) 
   
Left    .0196 
(.0201) 
-.00214 
(.0228) 
.0196 
(.0199) 
Unstable  -.0375** 
(.0159) 
-.0230** 
(.0110) 
-.0288** 
(.0140) 
-.0385** 
(.0186) 
-.0285** 
(.0140) 
Indust    .0294 
(.0510) 
 .0285 
(.0509) 
E. Eur    -.0412 
(.0305) 
-.0578 
(.0520) 
 
S. America -.0359* 
(.0182) 
  -.0271 
(.0294) 
-.0385 
(.0326) 
-.0263 
(.0294) 
Openness    -.00000576 
(.000360) 
-.000373 
(.000404) 
.0000138 
(.000373) 
Urbanisation .00101** 
(.000414) 
  .000903 
(.000576) 
.00104 
(.000962) 
.000859 
(000586) 
Real PC 
GDP 
  .00000458*** 
(.00000163) 
.000000205 
(.00000345) 
.00000189 
(.0000102) 
.000000460 
(.00000355) 
Constant .0627* 
(.0348) 
.137 
(.0374) 
.101** 
(.0418) 
.0901* 
(.0524) 
.121* 
(.0653) 
.0872 
(.0523) 
R2 .52 .14 .51 .52 .33 .51 
F-Statistic 10.0*** 2.10 10.1 6.89*** .870 7.56*** 
Observations 53 35 51 53 35 51 
F0 (G) .0000295 .713 .0915 .114 .0167 .0571 
F1 (B) 11.60*** 1.77 3.73* 1.03 1.50 1.10 
F2 (G, B, d) 4.35*** 1.12 1.50 .995 .814 .979 
B = 0: %ile 72 58 74 72 58 74 
 
Gini (1981-2000) instrumented by Gini (1961-80). 
SEs reported are robust. 
Controls in ‘Preferred Specification’ regressions selected using following criteria: 
(3) Create set of regression equations where all included controls are individually significant at the 10% level; 
(4) Select from among these equations the equation that minimises the root mean square error (RMSE). 
‘Full Controls’ regression results also shown as a robustness check. 
Significance level of individual regressors and of the overall equation denoted by ***:1%; **:5%; *:10%. 
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